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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
WATER AND SEWERAGE IN SCOTLAND* 
[A Review of responses to the Government's Consultation Paper] 
*/ am grateful to Clare Reidfor her assistance in this study. 
by James McGilvray, Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
1. Introduction 
The Government's Consultation Paper "Water and 
Sewerage in Scotland : Investing for our Future" 
was published in November 1992 and invited 
submissions, with a deadline of 29 January 1993. 
Despite this relatively short time period, around 
4800 submissions were received by the Scottish 
Office, an indication of the importance attached to 
the issue by individuals and organisations in 
Scotland (the vast majority of submissions, almost 
certainly over 99%, originated from Scotland). 
The Consultation Paper followed, and was 
presumably based on a consultant's report 
commissioned by the Government from merchant 
bankers Quayle Munro. Neither the terms of 
reference of this study, nor the consultant's report, 
have been made public, inviting suspicion that the 
Government's intention was to devise the most 
palliative, or politically least damaging way of 
privatising water and sewerage services in Scotland. 
The need to consider the future of the Scottish 
Water and Sewerage services arises mainly because 
of the Government's intention to reorganise local 
government in Scotland into a number of unitary 
authorities. The (nine) Regional Councils are to be 
abolished. Since water and sewerage services are 
regional responsibilities, their future status needs to 
be determined. 
A less direct but nevertheless influential additional 
reason for considering possible changes in the status 
of these services is the need for substantial 
investment to upgrade and extend the water and 
sewage networks. Rough estimates suggest that 
investment of around £5 billion over the next 15 
years may be needed. Given current Treasury rules 
and the current and prospective public sector 
budgetary position, this will be difficult to fund, 
prompting thoughts of possible private sector 
involvement. As we will see, this was a dominant 
theme in the consultation exercise. 
The Consultation Paper identified eight options for 
the future status of water and sewerage services in 
Scotland, while allowing that there may be others. 
Those identified were 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
Place the Services with the New Unitary 
Authorities 
Create Joint Boards of the New Unitary 
Authorities 
A Lead Authority Structure 
Create New Water Authorities 
Create a National Water Authority 
Joint Local Authority/Private Sector 
Schemes 
One or more Public Limited Companies 
Franchising 
Following a brief discussion of each option, the 
Paper concluded by listing 12 questions or criteria 
which directly or indirectly bear on the choice of 
option (Consultation Paper pp 29-30). The thrust 
of these questions was to seek to identify the most 
efficient and cost-effective way of delivering water 
and sewerage sendees to the consumer, and which 
would also be best placed to secure the future 
financial (investment) needs of the industry. More 
specific questions dealt with the future of the 
Central Scotland Water Development Board, and 
the need for a Drinking Water Inspectorate; 
however, it is significant that the first question 
addressed the issue of future investment finance, 
and financial and/or efficiency issues were the most 
frequently recurring themes in the Paper's 
discussion of options. 
This article briefly reviews the submissions to the 
Scottish Office, in particular those submissions 
which were more than a simple statement of 
support for, or opposition to a particular option or 
options, but which contained commentary and 
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Table 1 Submissions by type of organisation and option preferred or recommended 
Type of organisation 
1 Community, Voluntary Bodies 
2 District/Regional/Islands Councils 
3 Political parties 
4 Public sector bodies 
5 Trades Unions 
6 Trade, Commercial, Professional Associations 
7 Private Companies 
8 Academic 
9 Individual Letters 
10 Other 
TOTAL 
A-C 
66 
13 
21 
5 
9 
8 
4 
-
791 
-
917 
D-F 
4 
2 
2 
-
1 
3 
2 
2 
22 
2 
40 
Options 
G-H 
_ 
-
2 
-
-
1 
3 
-
1 
-
7 
No view or 
Unclear 
14 
1 
-
5 
-
3 
6 
-
10 
-
39 
All 
84 
16 
25 
10 
10 
15 
15 
2 
824 
1003 
Note: For a Key to the Options A-H, see Section 1 above. 
Table 2 Summary of preferred options 
Options A-C 
Options D-f 
Options G-H 
No clear preference 
Totals 
Maintain status quo 
New public sector bodies/joint venture 
Privatisation/franchising 
917 
40 
7 
39 
1003 
126 
18 
6 
29 
179 
Table 3 Submission by type of 
Type of organisation 
Community/Voluntary 
Political parties 
Public sector bodies 
Trade unions 
Trade, commercial profes. assoc 
Companies 
Academic 
Banks/consultants 
Total 
organisation and option preferred/recommended 
Options 
A-C 
5.5 
3.5 
2 
4 
6 
.5 
1 
.5 
23 
D-F 
1.5 
.5 
1 
1 
11 
1.5 
1 
7 
24.5 
G-H 
-
2 
-
-
-
2 
1 
5.5 
10.5 
Other 
-
-
-
-
1 
1 
1 
-
3 
- sample 
None 
2 
-
4 
-
5 
4 
3 
-
18 
of 79 
Total 
9 
6 
7 
5 
23 
9 
7 
13 
79 
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analysis of the issues raised by the Paper. 
Excluding community councils, district and regional 
authorities and political parties, these number about 
250; though a number of these submissions were 
quite short, they came from important organisations 
or groups whose views might be expected to carry 
some weight. The review provides a perspective 
against which the Government's announced choice 
of option may be assessed. 
2. Summary of all submissions 
For a summary breakdown of all submissions, this 
paper draws on the results of an analysis by 
Scottish and Westminster Communications (S & W) 
in March 1993. S & W counted 4733 submissions1 
of which 4057 (85.7%) were letters from "private 
individuals". Of the remaining 676, 275 were from 
Community Councils, 70 were from political parties 
and 58 were from regional, district and islands 
councils. The balance of 273 include sport, 
recreational and environmental bodies, trades 
unions, companies and other commercial 
organisations, churches, charities and health 
authorities, and other groups (see below). 
According to S & W, of these 676 responses only 
five "clearly [prefer] water and sewerage services to 
be transferred to the private sector. This represents 
a 0.7% response rate in favour of privatisation." 
Although there is no doubt that support for 
privatisation is very low, this statistic slightly 
understates the degree of support. 
First, support for privatisation should include those 
submissions which favour franchising [option H], 
since although this can permit the retention of the 
industry's assets in public hands, the management 
and operation of water and sewerage services are 
transferred to the private sector2. Secondly, in a 
small number of cases it is clear from reading the 
submissions that the authors favour privatisation, 
but consider it politically unrealistic, and hence 
recommend another opuon, or decline to support 
any particular option. Nevertheless, even taking 
account of these points, support for privatisation is 
negligible, as reported below. 
S & W Communications do not report a breakdown 
of the 4057 responses from private individuals, but 
from the sample results reported below, support for 
privatisation in this group is even lower. 
3. Sample results 
For the present study, a sample of just over 1000 
responses was drawn, and a number of these were 
then studied in greater detail. 
A breakdown of the sample by category of 
respondent, and by recommended option is shown 
in Table 1. 
The "letters from individuals" group can be 
regarded as a random sample of the 4057 "private 
individuals" identified in the S & W analysis, 
although in this study a number of submissions 
from individuals (for example academics, 
businessmen) have been transferred into one or 
other of the "institutional" categories. Table 1 
shows that only 1 of the 824 individual submissions 
examined supported privatisation - specifically, 
option G - while 791 (96%) supported the status 
quo, for the purpose of this analysis defined to be 
options A, B and C. Given that this is a large 
sample of individual submissions, it is quite clear 
that there is overwhelming public opposiuon to any 
significant change in the status of the water and 
sewerage industry. 
The sample of organisations is not a strictly random 
sample, but it is hopefully representative. It was 
obtained by scanning the list of submitting 
organisations and extracting individual submissions 
at intervals through the list. However, "political" 
submissions are under-represented and more 
"technical" submissions e.g. from engineers, 
consultants, banks, are over-represented. 
Nevertheless the composition of the sample does 
not differ appreciably from the composition of the 
total number of organisational responses, so the 
potential degree of bias is slight 
Of the 179 organisational responses, 6 (3.4%) 
favoured privatisation, of which 2 were "political" 
submissions, 126 (70%) favoured the status quo 
range of options, and 18 (10.1%) recommended 
new public sector bodies, and/or joint public/private 
sector ventures, though maintaining public 
ownership. Two or three of this latter group. 
however, envisaged subsequent privatisation of 
these public sector bodies at a later date. Finally, 
of the 29 (16.2%) not venturing a definite 
preference, a large number were voluntary or 
charitable bodies, such as angling associations or 
other outdoor recreational groups, who were 
concerned with issues such as access to reservoirs 
and surrounding lands, should there be a change in 
status. There is frequent criticism of the omission 
in the Consultation Paper of any discussion of 
access and other recreational aspects. 
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Results from this sample confirm that there is very 
strong support for the retention of water and 
sewerage services in their present form, or as close 
to that as may be feasible within the new 
framework of local government. Specifically, there 
is negligible support for privatisation, either by the 
creation of one or more public limited companies, 
or by franchising. However, although a large 
majority of submissions support the status quo 
options, a review of the evidence (see Section 4.1 
below) suggests that the status quo may be difficult 
to sustain in the wake of local government 
reorganisation, and could be significantly less 
efficient than the creation of new public sector 
bodies. 
The following section is based on a detailed 
analysis of 79 of the non-local authority 
submissions, including all of those in the larger 
sample in favour of privatisation, and most of those 
in favour of new public sector bodies. It should be 
noted that this group includes a number of 
submissions which were not included in the sample 
analysed in Tables 1 and 2, so the data in Table 3 
below are not a sub-set of the data in the earlier 
tables, though there is a considerable overlap3. 
4. Analysis of major issues 
Table 3 records the distribution of recommendations 
or preference by type of organisation, in a manner 
similar to Table 2, but slightly extended. In a 
number of cases, respondents suggested more than 
one option, sometimes combinations which cut 
across the groupings adopted in the table. In these 
cases, for counting purposes the "vote" has been 
split between groups of options; thus the recording 
of fractions in the table and column totals. In some 
cases it was not easy to determine which option 
was being recommended, and some degree of 
judgement has been applied. The "No Preference" 
column includes respondents whose preference 
could not be identified, as well as those who 
deliberately chose not to express a preference. 
Finally, some respondents suggested options which 
were distinctly different from, rather than variants 
of the eight listed in the Consultation Paper. 
4.1 Organisational structure 
Very few of the submissions examined considered 
the possibility of separate water authorities and 
sewerage authorities, and none of those studied in 
detail recommended such a separation. It seems 
safe to assume that dual purpose authorities will be 
established. 
Although Table 2 indicated that a large majority of 
respondents favoured the status quo, defined here as 
options A, B or C, and this remains a popular 
choice of the 79 submissions summarised in Table 
3, retention of the status quo in relation to 
organisational structure is most unlikely. Almost all 
the respondents who considered the issue accepted 
that the existing number of water authorities is a 
maximum and most accepted that a consolidation of 
existing authorities would be desirable on 
efficiency grounds, though direct evidence of 
economies of scale in water supply is apparently 
slight - see Sawkins (18)4. Since current proposals 
for local government reorganisation envisage 28 
unitary authorities, option A would require a 
fragmentation rather than a consolidation of existing 
units and was therefore considered by many 
respondents to be undesirable on efficiency grounds. 
Options B and C offer a compromise allowing local 
authority control and the benefits of scale, but these 
options - particularly option C - were not widely 
supported. 
Amongst those submissions which gave particular 
consideration to the number of water authorities and 
their boundaries, the most popular option was three 
units based broadly on hydrometric areas, namely: 
-South West Scodand including Strathclyde and 
Dumfries and Galloway; 
- South East Scotland including Borders, Lothian, 
Fife and part of Central; 
- North Scotland comprising Tayside, Grampian, 
Highland and part of Central. 
"Although a number of 
organisational configurations can 
be identified, it is considered that 
three organisations would provide 
the best balance to provide high 
quality services at least cost. 
These organisations would be 
based on broad hydrometric 
boundaries " (Institution of 
Civil Engineers[8]). 
"A single new Scottish Water 
Authority, or three separate 
Authorities serving the 
geographical areas of the north, 
east and west respectively would 
be preferable on the grounds that 
it would offer meaningful 
economies of scale " (Crouch 
Quarterly Economic Commentary 40 Vol. 19, No. 1, 1993 
Hogg Waterman [7]). 
"A reorganised structure based on 
river basins which would produce 
three new water authorities is as 
follows: 
It is suggested that three water 
and sewerage authorities 
structured as outlined above 
would be strong, viable units 
capable of fully meeting the 
Government's aims." (E 
McKenna [14]). 
Although the scale/efficiency arguments in favour 
of such a structure seem plausible, no hard 
empirical evidence was offered on economies of 
scale. However, a 3-Unit structure was the most 
popular choice of Trade, Commercial and 
Professional Associations, and of Banks/Consultants 
(Table 3). Each unit is claimed to be big enough to 
capture economies of scale, while retaining a some 
"regional" identity determined by natural (river 
basin) boundaries. Although small by England and 
Wales standards, the proposed units are considered 
big enough to offer comparable career opportunities. 
Three Units also offer opportunities for intra-
Scottish "yardstick" comparisons of the form being 
developed by Ofwat for England and Wales. 
A three-unit structure is consistent with many of the 
options listed, notably Option B (joint boards), 
Option D (New Water Authorities), Option F and of 
course both "privatisation" Options G and H. It 
may be worth noting here that Option C, the "Lead 
Authority" concept, was -at least on the basis of the 
sample examined - the least popular of the so-called 
public sector options. Thus if the consultation 
process has a significant influence in the final 
choice of option, Option C can be excluded. 
Likewise, on the basis of the technical and 
administrative arguments advanced, an 
organisational set-up of three distinct authorities for 
mainland Scotland would seem to command 
significant support.5 
4.2 Ownership 
Of those respondents expressing an opinion or 
preference, an overwhelming majority supported the 
retention of water and sewerage services within the 
public sector, and many were explicitly hostile to 
the concept of privatisation. A number of the 
respondents supported continued public ownership 
for reasons of social or moral principle, viz 
"Water and sewerage supplies 
should be available to all without 
any consideration of profit motive 
or personal circumstances." 
(Scottish Association of Health 
Councils [19]). 
"We are implacably opposed to 
the withholding of water from 
people in need on grounds of 
cost." (Justice and Peace 
Scotland [13]). 
but many were based on theoretical or practical 
economic arguments. Water supply is a "natural 
monopoly" to an even greater degree than other 
utilities, with a very low marginal cost. In water 
supply, the basic raw material is in abundant supply 
in Scotland and, apart from some highly localised 
areas, the capacity of the system is more than 
adequate (though renovation and upgrading of 
infrastructure is needed). Although difficult to 
measure precisely, comparative cost data appear to 
indicate that the existing system is managed 
efficiently, and review of the submissions indicates 
a high degree of customer satisfaction (in fact, of 
the submissions examined, not a single one was 
critical of the industry in its present form, even 
amongst those who proposed a change of 
ownership). 
This very brief summary of the arguments 
supporting public sector status for the industry 
underlines the point that it is difficult to deploy 
most of the usual arguments in favour of 
privatisation, in the case of the Scottish water and 
sewerage industry. Competition is not a feasible 
proposition. The water part of the industry is 
already run on commercial lines, and to extend this 
to sewerage services does not require privatisation, 
so that the industry need not be constrained by, or 
be a constraint on the public purse. Proponents of 
privatisation of public sector industries typically 
argue that a privatised industry would be more 
efficient, but the scope for static efficiency gains, 
other than those obtainable by consolidation into 
fewer operating units (which does not necessarily 
involve privatisation), would appear to be limited in 
this case. 
"The public water authorities in 
Scotland have been very 
successful in supplying excellent 
quality of water at very modest 
cost." (Scottish Association of 
Health Councils [19J). 
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"It is a matter of record that the 
Scottish public has been well 
served by the present water and 
sewerage services structure." 
(Crouch Hogg Waterman [7]). 
Against these hypothetical gains must be set the 
certain cost of regulation and the costs associated 
with the establishment of a separate billing and 
payments regime. If disconnections for non-
payment continue to be illegal in Scotland, costs 
will be incurred in prosecuting for non-payment. If 
disconnections are legalised, costs will be incurred 
by the social and public health services in coping 
with the consequences of disconnections. 
In the light of these arguments, and in the face of 
such strong opposition from the general public, 
potential efficiency gains would need to be 
considerable to justify privatisation. However, the 
major theme in most of those submissions which 
were supportive of complete or partial privatisation 
of the industry, was that privatisation would enable 
the industry to finance a £5bn investment 
programme without adding to the public sector 
borrowing requirement. This has nothing to do 
with economic efficiency, whatever its appeal on 
other grounds. 
Three of the submissions reviewed unambiguously 
favoured privatisation Option G6 while four equally 
clearly supported franchising (Option H) or a 
variant of franchising7, and one supported ekher 
Option G or H8. Three others proposed 
arrangements which involved some degree of 
privatisation, but could not be readily identified 
with one particular option9. 
Almost all these submissions emphasised the 
potential efficiency gains from privatisation, but in 
no case was there any attempt to quantify these 
benefits. Respondents asserted that privatisation 
would improve efficiency, but there are costs to be 
set against these potential gains, including 
privatisation costs (one-off but not inconsiderable), 
regulation costs and the administrative costs of 
separate billing, collection and enforcement. If 
metering of households (favoured by Ofwat) were 
introduced, discounted costs would almost certainly 
exceed benefits. However, all the submissions in 
favour of privatisation appeared to assume that 
benefits would exceed costs, without any attempt to 
validate these assumptions. 
A number of respondents list readier access to 
investment finance as an advantage of privatisation, 
implying a shortage of investment finance for the 
industry in the past. This may be a strong motive 
for privatisation, but it is not a justification. 
"We do not believe that the need 
to raise capital should be the 
overriding consideration in 
deciding the form of the future 
management of water and 
sewerage in Scotland." (Scottish 
Landowners' Federation [22]). 
Two of the proponents of franchising - Halcrow [9] 
and Hill Samuel [10] - proposed that the franchiser 
should be a public sector body, while the franchisee 
is private sector. A more complex variant of this 
arrangement, but which offers other advantages, 
was proposed by Jakubik and Turbeville of 
Goldman and Sachs [12]. These proposals 
attempted to secure what is perceived to be the best 
of both worlds by marrying public sector ownership 
of the assets with private sector operating efficiency 
and access to capital. However a careful review of 
franchising by McMaster and Sawkins [15] cast 
doubt on the viability, or at least the attractiveness 
of franchising. At a practical level, franchising was 
viewed as the most complex of the options listed, a 
novelty in the UK context, and almost certainly a 
more expensive option than privatisation through 
the pic or trade sale route. It was also argued that 
it would be difficult to introduce a system of 
franchising, as well as a restructuring of the 
industry by the target date of 1996. 
"...serious doubts must exist that 
adequate [franchise] contracts can 
be developed to suit Scottish 
water and sewerage legislation, 
culture and legal framework 
within the timescale available." 
(Institution of Civil Engineers[8]). 
"...it is considered that preparation 
of suitably comprehensive and 
effective [franchise] contract 
documents and procedures would 
be virtually impossible within the 
required timescale. Similarly the 
monitoring of contract 
performance would require 
very expensive monitoring 
arrangements." (Institution of 
Water Officers [11]). 
Nevertheless, some form of franchising option on 
the lines sketched above may be proposed as a 
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politically credible means of introducing private 
sector management and capital. 
programme." (Association of 
Consulting Engineers[24]). 
43 Investment 
As pointed out above the Consultation Paper saw 
privatisation or franchising as a way of financing 
levels of investment which would be difficult to 
fund while the industry remained in the public 
sector. It is widely accepted that legislation and 
rules which count capital expenditures as part of the 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) have 
constrained investment, not only in the water 
industry10 but also in other former nationalised 
industries such as electricity, gas and 
telecommunications. While it is widely 
acknowledged that this has resulted in considerable 
resource misallocation in the economy, the system 
appears impervious to change. 
For respondents who supported privatisation or 
franchising (in which the franchisee undertakes 
investment expenditure), removal of public sector 
constraints on capital investment was seen as a 
major benefit of privatisation. 
Other submissions proposed a variety of 
approaches. Most frequent was a call to amend 
the rules, so that capital spending which is 
amortised though charges for the services provided 
is not included in the PSBR (this would in practice 
involve adding the cost of sewerage services to the 
present separate water charge). 
"A crucial concern is the 
Treasury rules on PSBR. We 
consider they should be altered to 
prevent artificial restrictions being 
imposed, particularly where costs 
are ultimately financed by the 
customers. Considerable 
precedent exists in Europe for 
such a change." (CBI [5]). 
"...other than Treasury dogma 
which insists that the borrowing 
by any public body for capital 
investment must be considered 
part of the PSBR in spite of the 
fact that it can be financed by 
water rates, there would appear to 
be no reason why change of 
ownership is necessary for the 
water industry in Scotland purely 
in terms of meeting the 
requirements of the capital 
"We do not accept the arguments 
that privatisation is necessary to 
avoid the constraints of public 
expenditure and provide easy 
access to private funds. The 
consumer always pays for the 
cost of these services including 
the cost of borrowing funds for 
the major programme of capital 
expenditure. This should 
therefore not be constrained by 
Treasury rules affecting the 
public sector borrowing 
requirements, and these artificial 
rules should be changed." 
(Babtie Shaw & Morton [1]). 
This proposal was frequently combined with the 
suggestion of writing off existing debt at the time 
of reorganisation; debt charges allegedly account for 
40% of the industry's recurrent expenditure, which 
if written off could be redirected into investment. 
However unless the assets of the industry were 
actually sold, precedence would suggest that such a 
proposal would be resisted by the Treasury.11 
Other suggestions included BOT (Build, Own, 
Transfer) and BOOT (Build, Own, Operate, 
Transfer) deals in which the private sector 
undertakes particular capital projects (and may also 
operate them), receives a service or facility fee 
from the public sector water authority, and transfers 
ownership of the assets concerned to the authority 
at a future date. Such schemes have been popular 
in a number of developing countries in recent years, 
including water supply and highway projects.12 
Several submissions proposed a combination of 
methods for financing investment, including a 
relaxation of Treasury rules governing PSBR 
categories, debt write-off, BOT/BOOT schemes and 
higher charges. Several noted that since 
privatisation about 60% of investment in English 
and Welsh water companies has been financed by 
higher charges (and most of the remainder by 
borrowing - equity finance has been negligible). 
The view was widely expressed diat the future 
ownership structure of the industry should not be 
dictated by (relatively short-term) investment 
finance needs13. Overall, those responding to the 
Consultation Paper did not attach the same 
importance to the sources of investment finance, as 
did the Government, correctly viewing this as a 
problem of Treasury rules and regulations rather 
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than as a problem of resourcing the future needs of 
the industry. 
"A major assumption behind the 
paper is that there are constraints 
on public expenditure which 
cannot be allowed to rise to meet 
the needs of water and sewerage 
services. This highlights a strong 
contradiction - if the English 
water pic's put up their charges 
in order to borrow from the 
European Investment Bank, and 
invest the loan in water 
infrastructure that is private 
expenditure and acceptable, but if 
Regional Councils do precisely 
the same, that is public 
expenditure which is controlled 
by the government. If in fact 
water and sewerage expenditure 
is funded directly by those 
served, it does not impinge on 
any other aspect of general public 
expenditure and need not be 
classified as such." (Institution of 
Water and Environmental 
Management [25]). 
5.0 Conclusion and postscript 
An overwhelming majority of submissions 
supported retention of water and sewerage services 
within the public sector. Less than 1% of the 
submissions reviewed supported either direct 
privatisation or franchising. 
Nevertheless, a reorganisation of the water and 
sewerage industry in Scotland will be necessary if 
the proposed reform of local government is 
implemented. Although a clear majority of 
submissions supported one or other of the "status 
quo" options - namely, that the industry continues 
to be part of local government services - this seems 
unlikely. Amongst the alternatives, the most 
favoured solution was for the establishment of new 
public sector water authorities, most commonly 
three such authorities. 
Submissions supporting privatisation generally cited 
greater efficiency as a benefit, but no evidence was 
presented to show that these benefits would exceed 
the associated costs, which could be substantial. 
The major argument advanced in favour of 
privatisation or franchising was that it would permit 
access to finance outside the constraints of the 
PSBR. While this is undoubtedly true, it is an 
exclusively pragmatic argument unrelated to any 
economic criteria of resource allocation. Many 
submissions argued that administrative rules on 
public finance should not dictate the form of 
ownership and management of the industry. 
Since the completion of the first version of this 
paper, the Government has announced its intention 
to reorganise the industry into 3 public water 
authorities, which will be run on commercial lines 
and which will seek private sector involvement. At 
this stage, no further details have been announced. 
Critics have argued that this is an intermediate step 
forced on the Government by a public opinion 
strongly hostile to privatisation, and that the 
intention is to prepare the way for later 
privatisation, made easier by the delinking of water 
and sewerage services from local government 
control. Whether or not this is the case, the 
evidence culled from the submissions strongly 
suggests that, of the public sector options, that 
selected by the Government is best in terms of 
efficiency, management and flexibility in sources of 
investment; however, there are important issues to 
be resolved in relation to regulation and democratic 
co.ntrol. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. "The Future of Water and Sewerage Services in Scotland: An Overview of Responses to the Scottish 
Office", Scottish and Westminster Communications, Edinburgh, March 1993. The final tally can vary 
according to how duplicate letters, petitions, etc are treated. 
2. A similar arrangement has been mooted for rail services in which ownership of the track will remain 
with the state or a state corporation. 
3. A number of submissions were not available at the time of the preliminary analysis. 
4. "The existence of economies of scale in water supply and sewerage has been frequently asserted but 
seldom tested empirically." (Sawkins, p.3). 
5. Opinion was divided on whether water and sewerage services in the Western Isles, Orkney and Shetland 
should continue to be the responsibility of the Islands Councils, or be transferred to the North Scotland 
(or other mainland) authority. This issue is not considered in this paper, but for a good argument for 
the status quo see Shetland Island Council [23]. 
6. Bell Lawrie White (2), Messrs Hogarth and Conkey (Scottish Young Conservatives) (6) Caledonian 
Paper (4). 
7. Halcrow (9), HOI Samuel (10), Messrs Jakubik and Turbeville (Goldman Sachs) (12), Saur Water (17). 
8. Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association (21). 
9. Scottish Chambers of Commerce (20), Dr John Riddell (Strathclyde University) (16), C & W 
Consultants (3). Other submissions proposing private sector involvement were counted under option 
F, but these generally involved a lesser and/or more specific form of involvement than the 3 listed here. 
10. "The water and sewerage industry in Scotland has been underfunded over many years, leading to a 
progressive deterioration of the existing infrastructure services and treatment systems." (Crouch Hogg 
Waterman [7]). 
11. In England and Wales, the debt write-off would have been reflected in the selling price and hence at 
least partially recoverable. 
Quarterly Economic Commentary 45 Vol. 19, No. 1, 1993 
12. A UK example is the Dartford Tunnel. It should be noted that BOT and BOOT Schemes do not 
automatically escape the PSBR stigma. 
13. See for example the Scottish Landowners Federation (22). 
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